, and the impaction of entrained matter on a high efficiency particulate air (HEPA or absolute) filter, capable of retaining particles of 03-3,t diameter with a 99 997 % efficiency or better at rated throughput. The treated air can be returned to the room or ducted outside. Some use a laminar flow of filtered air, which may be re-cycled through the machine, to protect the user and the test materials. Finally a few models have relied on the incineration of exhaust air instead of filtration.
Several types of biological safety cabinet are currently available and other, older models are in routine use in laboratories throughout the country. Most of them work by exhaustion of air away from the user (Williams and Lidwell, 1957) , and the impaction of entrained matter on a high efficiency particulate air (HEPA or absolute) filter, capable of retaining particles of 03-3,t diameter with a 99 997 % efficiency or better at rated throughput. The treated air can be returned to the room or ducted outside. Some use a laminar flow of filtered air, which may be re-cycled through the machine, to protect the user and the test materials. Finally a few models have relied on the incineration of exhaust air instead of filtration.
The ability to test the safety of a cabinet is vital, either for a new installation or in-use tests on existing equipment. Safety, in practical terms, is the ability to contain an aerosol of pathogenic microorganisms; it depends on the airflow through the unit and the integrity of the constituent seals and filters. The pattern of airflows and the presence of gross leaks can be demonstrated easily with titanium tetrachloride smoke. An anemometer is needed to measure air velocity. The simplest type is a set of rotating vanes which wind a pointer round a dial while a more complex electronic version uses vanes to generate electrical impulses and provide a direct reading and recordable output. Thermo-anemometers depend on the cooling of a hot wire or a thermistor bead by the air; these also provide a direct readout and sample a much smaller area. Filter integrity is measured by the British Standard sodium-flame test (BS 3928 (Dyment, personal communication) at a cost of £1000. Two of the other possible in-situ tests require expensive equipment, namely, the di-octyl pthalate (DOP) smoke test, and particle analysis with the ROYCO counter. These tests can be done on a contract basis, but an aerosol of bacterial spores provides a simple alternative, which is directly relevant to the function of a biological safety cabinet (Darlow, 1969) . Particles in a monodispersed aerosol are 1-3,u diameter or less and present the best challenge to a HEPA filter. Smaller particles are trapped more readily because of Brownian movement. This paper describes the methods which were developed for a survey of safety cabinets and some of the results.
Methods

MICROBIOLOGY
Bacillus subtilis var globigii (NCTC no. 10073) was used as the indicator organism. Spores were obtained and stored in methanol (Beeby and Whitehouse, 1965) ; the suspension was diluted with distilled water before use. A strain of Escherichia coli was obtained from routine hospital cultures and used to make a suspension in distilled water. Lemco peptone agar was used as a culture medium and plates were incubated at 37°C for 18 hours and then left at room temperature for 24 hours before reading. The aerosols were generated in a Bird (R) micronebulizer (fig 1) 
Results
MICROBIOLOGY
Calibration of micronebulizer A fine aerosol was produced at 10 psi which used 0 5 ml per minute while at 60 psi the spray contained many large drops and used 2-2 ml per minute. Many particles from both sprays reached the bottom of the sieve sampler and so were 1-2 ,u diameter (fig 2) . A 10-second aerosol at 10 psi from 106 per ml spores theoretically should have produced 229 per litre of air. The average count observed in 14 tests was 128; thus over half the spores were in the aerosol. The release of a similar aerosol inside a cabinet with the ventilation turned off filled the air in front of the cabinet with enough spores to produce confluent growth on the slit-sampler plate. 
Deposition of bacteria on cabinet floors
The number of air changes per minute in the cabinets varied from one to fifty. Very few particles were found on plates when the air changes exceeded nine, but large numbers were found in cabinets with 6-8, 2-1, 1 2, and 0 9 changes (see table). The least deposition of all was in the downward laminar flow unit; although the micronebulizer was above the plates and the air flow was towards them, presumably the return of air from the plates acted as a barrier to the spores, and the use of titanium tetrachloride smoke showed an air shadow above the plate. (300 linear feet per minute). The variations in velocity of any cabinet averaged ± 20%, but could be higher when someone was working at the cabinet (fig 3) or walking past it.
Discussion
The BIRD micronebulizer is a simple reflux blast nebulizer and depends on the Bernouilli effect, modified by an anvil (Hayes and Robinson, 1970) ; it is part of the BIRD ventilator, which is operated at 60 psi. However, the aerosol produced by 10 psi is preferable for cabinet tests. The difference between the number of spores in the aerosol and the expected number calculated by weighing the nebulizer could be due to evaporation of up to 50% of the suspending fluid rather than aerosolization, with consequent concentrations of spores in the remainder (Darlow, personal communication) . The number of spores (2 5 x 104) in the standard test, which had been chosen in order to produce confluent growth on the slit sampler plate when a cabinet was switched off, is well above that released in most laboratory manipulations (Reitman and Wedum, 1956; Kenny and Sabel, 1968) and is exceeded only by opening the lid of a blender or the use of an,ultrasonic celldisruptor. Most of the cabinets dealt equally well with 2 5 x 106 spores (108 per ml), a concentration similar to that used by Barbeito and Taylor (1968 The performance of tests in sets of 10 provided an internal control; occasionally the first count would be high and subsequent ones would tail off, indicating a technical hitch. Wedum (1964) assumed that the inhalation of 10 particles in five minutes, ie, 2 cu ft of air, constitutedahuman infective dose for such dangerous pathogens as Coxiella burneti and Franciscella tularensis. Our equivocal counts were below this; on the other hand there was little doubt about the results from an inadequate cabinet because the slit sampler plate exposed outside it usually displayed heavy or confluent growth. The two new units which liberated large numbers of spores into the room and had a low air flow were those that worked on air incineration and have since been withdrawn from sale. The results of the tests on the filtered air were excellent. The 99'997 % efficiency implies that 3 particles per 100 000 might pass through; in practice most of the filters were more efficient. However, the standard burst of spores appears in retrospect to have been inadequate; later tests used 105 spores but a two-minute spray from 108 per ml would be a better challenge. The fact that a filter might not be a total barrier to a very heavy concentration of bacteria could be important; in this case it would be essential to duct the effluent out of the laboratory or to use two filters in series. The infected exhaust from the two cabinets which worked on air incineration was recycled into the room and so made these cabinets doubly hazardous. Line (1972) obtained similar results on one of these models. Although the initial work was aimed at tests on new machines, those on other installations were very revealing. New equipment rarely worked as well as in the test laboratory. The length, type, and geometry of connexion ducts were important; the drain pipe type has much better air flow characteristics than the ribbed variety. The use of 10 extra feet of the latter : reduced the air flow from 07 to 0-15 metres per second in one installation, and in several others higher duty fans were required to overcome duct resistence. Two installations failed because of holes between the fan and filter, one contained a faulty junction, and the other was due to the use of the same fan and ducting for a fume cupboard in an adjoining biochemistry department (unbeknown to the microbiologist). Faulty maintenance was also evident: several of the cabinets tested in situ had blocked filters, and two instances have come to light in which replacement filters were incorrectly bedded down in laminar-flow units.
Thus there are many pitfalls in the selection, installation, and use of biological safety cabinets and operators should be able to test them. The micronebulizer worked well, cost £6-50, and was readily available. The Wright's nebulizer is another simple and cheap unit, often used in the physiotherapy department for aerosol inhalations. An impinger cost about £200 and gas cylinders and pumps are usually to hand in the laboratory. The electronic anemometer was robust and foolproof, it cost around £lOO-00, while the thermistor type was £52-00. Cost, therefore, is not a deterrent. The cabinets should be testedwithsporetests and theanemometer at monthly intervals; more complex tests such as the use of DOP could be done on a contract basis; to test a new installation, after changing filters (particularly on laminar flow models) and possibly at yearly intervals.
